Plato wrote most of his philosophy in the form of dialogues, little plays in which two or more people discuss a topic. Often, Plato used Socrates as one of the main characters in these dialogues. We don’t know how much of these dialogues were just made up by Plato and how much is a record of actual conversations that took place.
This dialogue takes place just before Socrates went on trial. One of the things that Socrates was accused of was impiety – not being respectful to the gods of the city. The dialogue begins with Socrates outside the courthouse. Since he is about to go on trial for impiety, he wants to work out what the measure of piety is – how do we know whether an act or a person is pious or impious, respectful or not to the gods?
He meets a man named Euthyphro who is about to accuse his own father of the murder of a field worker. Socrates asks him if he can help him come up with the measure, the criterion, of piety. The following is a paraphrase of the conversation:
(NB: I have taken huge liberties with the text in these dialogues. They are very different from the actual texts themselves, but I have tried to outline some of the key arguments in the order in which they appear in the text and to maintain the sense of dialogue. My aim was to give you an introduction to the ideas discussed and to use those ideas as a catalyst for your own thoughts.)
First definition…
Euthyphro: I think that a good definition of piety is exactly what I am doing now. I am prosecuting my father for something that he did wrong. Surely, this is a pious act!
Socrates: But this is no use to me, because this is merely an example of piety. I need a measure that I can compare actions and people against. This single example doesn’t really explain what piety is! I need a general rule.
Second definition…
Euthyphro: OK, well what about this definition then?: ‘piety is what is pleasing to the gods’.
Socrates: Well that is certainly better because it is a general rule that I could follow. However, my problem with this definition is that the gods often don’t agree with each other, so what is pleasing to one, isn’t always pleasing to another. How do we know which of the gods is right?
Third definition…
Euthyphro: Well I can easily improve that definition: ‘Piety is what all gods love, and impiety is what all the gods hate’.
Socrates: OK, but I still have a problem with this definition. Is something loved by the gods because it is pious, or is something pious because it is loved by the gods?
Euthyphro: I’m not sure what you’re getting at, Socrates.
Socrates: Let me explain: Is an object loved when no one loves it? If no one loves me, then am I loved?
Euthyphro: No.
Socrates: So, something pious isn’t loved by the gods if the gods don’t love it?
Euthyphro: OK, no.
Socrates: So, then it seems that something isn’t pious because it is loved by the gods.
Fourth definition…
Euthyphro: I am quite confused Socrates, why don’t you explain to me what you think makes something pious.
Socrates: My first thought is that piety is something that is morally good, something that is just. But then there are lots of things that are morally good but not pious. If I am courageous, then I’m not necessarily being pious. If I am kind to someone, then I am not necessarily being respectful to the gods.
Fifth definition…
Euthyphro: I will attempt one final definition: piety is the art of sacrifice and prayer. It is the skill of being able to give gifts to the gods.
Socrates: And what benefit do these gifts bring to the gods? The gods don’t need any help from us. And isn’t it hubris to think that we are powerful enough to help the gods?
Euthyphro: But when we give gifts to the gods, we honour them, we treat them with respect.
Socrates: And what makes that a pious thing to do?
Euthyphro: Because it is pleasing to the gods.
The discussion ends up going back in a circle, and Socrates is left not knowing how to judge whether something is pious.
Explain what is meant by piety.
Explain what the problem was with Euthyphro’s second definition of piety.
Explain Euthyphro’s third definition and the question that Socrates asks about it (the dilemma).
Is good behaviour loved by teachers because it is good, or is it good behaviour because it is loved by teachers?