George Berkeley: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

Can something that no one perceives exist?

Background

George Berkeley (12 March 1685 – 14 January 1753) was an Irish philosopher and Church of Ireland Bishop. In his book, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Bishop George Berkeley argued that there are no Mind-Independent objects in the way that John Locke described. The immediate objects of perception (i.e. ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc.) are mind-dependent objects. This idea is called Immaterialism. (Later it was called Idealism.)

In the book Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous Berkeley sets out his theory of, what became known as, immaterialism or idealism. The basic tenet of immaterialism is that reality is equivalent to mind, spirit, or consciousness. The book is written as a dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. Berkeley's views are represented by Philonous (Greek: "lover of mind"), while Hylas ("hyle", Greek: "matter") embodies the Irish thinker's opponents, in particular John Locke.

Berkeley's attack on indirect realism

Firstly, he attacked Locke’s notion of indirect realism. Indirect realism is the idea that we do not directly experience objects in the external world. Instead, our minds produce representations of the world based on the sense-data that enters through our eyes, ears and so on.

Berkeley’s attack on Locke’s indirect realism: we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects

Berkeley argues that Locke’s notion of substance could not cause ideas since they are too different. Perceptions are ‘fleeting and variable’ yet according to Locke, substance must be unchanging and fixed. One can also ask (though not Berkeley’s example): how can something invisible like a photon cause something visible, like light?

If Locke’s representational causal theory of perception were true, it could never be known to be true – since one cannot correlate impressions or ideas with the qualities of which they are impressions or ideas in order to give inductive confirmation to the postulated causal connection.

If it is a hypothesis – an inference to the best explanation – then it is not a hypothesis that can ever be confirmed or disconfirmed in experience. (E.g. The existence of Uranus was hypothesised because of the movements of the other visible planets, but even at the time it was [at least in principle] possible to confirm this hypothesis.)

Berkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary distinction

Berkeley argued that the Locke’s primary/secondary distinction was false. He argued that primary qualities are mind-dependent because they are subject to interpersonal and intrapersonal perceptual variation (objects can appear to have different sizes, shapes, speeds, etc) just like secondary qualities (eg objects can appear to have different colours, tastes, etc) and are therefore mind-dependent.

He also argued that we cannot imagine primary qualities without secondary ones. E.g. You cannot imagine a colourless, tasteless apple. You end up stripping away the apple itself.

Berkeley’s 'Master' argument

Berkeley considered the following to be his most clinching argument for his idealism. His argument rested on the question of whether it’s possible for a tree to exist outside of the mind. If it is possible then we should be able to think of an unconceived tree. But as soon as we try to think about this tree, we have conceived it. So we have failed and there is no good reason to believe that trees exist outside of the mind.

We can formulate the argument as follows:

We can conceive of a tree existing independent of all minds only if we can conceive of the tree existing unconceived.
BUT an unconceived conceived thing is a contradiction.
∴ we cannot conceive of a tree (or anything else) existing independently of all minds

I.e.. What exists independently of all minds? - the answer to this question must be nothing, because as soon as we think of an answer, it exists in someone’s mind!

Philonous: … I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

Hylas: If it comes to that, the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

Philonous: How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

Hylas: No, that were a contradiction.

Philonous: Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?

Hylas: It is.

Philonous: The tree or house therefore which you think of, is conceived by you.

Hylas: How should it be otherwise?

Philonous: And what is conceived, is surely in the mind.

Hylas: Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

Philonous: How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds, whatsoever?

Hylas: That was I own an oversight […] I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but this is all. And this is far from proving, that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all spirits

Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

And it seems no less evident that the various Sensations or Ideas imprinted on the Sense... cannot exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving them... For as to what is said of the absolute Existence of unthinking Things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their Esse is Percipi, nor is it possible they should have any Existence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them.

—George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

Criticisms of Berkeley: the problem of illusions and hallucinations

The difference between an illusion and a hallucination is that illusions are caused by something mind-independent but hallucinations don’t exist. But if there are no mind-independent things, we can’t tell the difference.

Berkeley replies by saying that we can tell the difference. Hallucinations are usually ‘dim, irregular, and confused’. In illusions, we don’t perceive things wrongly – what we perceive is real – an oar really does look crooked in water.

The role of God in Berkeley’s argument.

Berkeley’s arguments against mind-independent objects remove our reasons to believe that anything other than my own mind-dependent experience exists. This is called solipsism

Berkeley responds by arguing that all of our perceptions originate in the mind of God.

He argues this because he says that, since it can’t be matter that causes our perceptions, it must be a mind. And the only mind powerful enough to do this is God’s.

Tasks:

Explain the Master argument
Give an objection to Berkeley's immaterialism
Evaluate Berkeley’s immaterialism

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