Kant believed that morality was part of this synthetic a priori knowledge that was part of our operating system and a prerequisite for making sense of experience. As a result, he thought he could set about reverse engineering the nature of morality.
Kant’s first job is to work out what the highest good, or summum bonum is. What is it we are aiming at? What is our purpose? He concludes that this summum bonum must be good will, which he defines as following the right rule.
The Summum Bonum must be good in-itself, good without qualification/conditions, good for no other reason than it is good, necessarily good.
The Summum Bonum cannot be money, intelligence or other such things we normally value. Many goods are qualified goods, that is good in some circumstances but not in others. E.g. Money and intelligence can be used for good, but also evil.
We can work out what the Summum Bonum is by looking at what we are designed to do. ‘Nature does nothing in vain.’ Human beings are unique in having the power of reason. Reason is not well-suited to achieving happiness, our instincts are more useful for that. So happiness cannot be the purpose of reason.
Neither then can the Summum Bonum cannot be contemplation, since contemplation has no use for the practical aspect of our reasoning.
Therefore, he concludes that the purpose of reason must be in morality, good will. This involves all aspects of our powers of reason. While the good will is not the complete good, it is nonetheless the highest good, and thus ought to condition all other goods, including happiness.
“A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself.”
–Groundwork for the Metaphysics of MoralsFor Kant, a good will is a will which is guided by reason, the power to choose to act according to right maxims. Good will is a will that acts out of duty - not according to duty:
If I act in accordance with duty, then it is not necessarily the case that it is done for no other reason than it is good: e.g. a shopkeeper might give the right change because it is good for business, not simply out of duty. If, on the other hand, I act out of (motivated by) duty, then it is done for no other reason than it is good, so it is necessarily good.
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
— Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of MoralsWe can interpret the first formulation as entailing a four-stage process for establishing what to do:
Formulate the reason for acting as a rule - as a maxim, as an imperative. An imperative is an instruction to act in the form: Act like this.
Universalise the maxim: If an imperative describes the summum bonum, then it would be good-in-itself. That means it would be universally good. A categorical imperative is a maxim which is good-in-itself - ‘No matter what you wish to achieve, act in such-and-such a way’ This is as opposed to a hypothetical imperative. A hypothetical imperative is a maxim which is good for some other reason. - If you wish to achieve x, act in such-and-such a way
The contradiction in conception test: does willing a maxim to become universal law entail a contradiction in conception? E.g. if everyone jumps queues, there’d be no such thing as queuing/if no one keeps promises, there is no such thing as promising. If so, then one has a perfect duty not to act on it: One must, to the fullest possible extent, never do X.
The contradiction in will test: does willing a maxim to become universal law entail a contradiction in will? A person could will that people do not help each other, only if she never thought she would ever want (or will) anyone’s help. If so, then one has an imperfect duty not to act on it: One must sometimes and to some extent not do X.
Some might argue that clashing rules/duties are an issue for Kant's ethics.
According to Kant, if there are categorical imperatives, then there are rules that are universally true. However, if there are rules that are universally true, then, then it cannot be the case that duties clash. Kant argues that the idea that duties described by categorical imperatives clash is simply inconceivable. (Note: For Kant, it is OK for imperfect duties to clash, but not perfect duties.) However, isn't it true that duties do clash? Can't there be situations where you have to choose between, for example, telling lies or stealing? Situations where, as Jean-Paul Satre wrote, 'no rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do' (Existentialism is a Humanism, 1946).
Explain the four steps of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
Can you think of an objection to this approach?
Are you convinced by it? Do you think it describes a good action?