At the council of Nicaea, the early church decided that Jesus and God the Father were of the same substance, were consubstantial, and they wrote it down in the Creed, which is read out at churches every Sunday. But this wasn’t the end of the problems regarding the identity of Jesus. A new problem arose in the fourth century: If Jesus is of the same substance as God, does that mean that Mary (Jesus’ mother) is the mother of God?
Nestorius, the Bishop of Constantinople thought that the answer was no: Mary is the ‘Mother of God’, only if she gave Jesus his divinity. But Mary cannot have given him divinity, since she is not divine. It was God that gave Jesus his divinity, and Mary gave him his humanity. Therefore, Mary is not the ‘Mother of God’.
Mary is the ‘Mother of God’, only if she gave Jesus his divinity.
But God gave Jesus his divinity, and Mary gave him his humanity
∴ Mary is not the ‘Mother of God’.
Nestorius thought that calling Mary ‘the Mother of God’ confused the divine and human natures of Jesus. Instead, Nestorius, taught that Jesus’ divine substance and human substance came together in one prosopon. Prosopon was the Greek word for the mask that actors wore on the stage.
However, Cyril, the Bishop of Alexandria (who was the Bishop responsible for the murder of the Philosopher Hypatia) said that Bishop Nestorius must not really believe that Jesus is God at all and denounced him as a heretic (someone who contradicted the Church). He argued that Nestorius is right, only if Jesus has two substances. But, whilst Cyril accepted Jesus had two natures: a human nature and a divine nature, he argued that Jesus only has one substance (which is the same as God’s). Therefore, Nestorius is wrong, and his teachings were heresy.
Nestorius is right, only if Jesus has two substances
Jesus only has one substance, which is the same as God’s.
∴ Nestorius is wrong, and a heretic
The Emperor at the time, Theodosius, called another council, this time at Ephesus. Cyril managed to persuade the council to condemn Nestorius. However, some people at the council had even more extreme views and denied that Jesus even had two natures, saying that he must only have one.
The Pope, Leo, couldn’t attend the council but wasn’t happy with the result. He condemned it as a den of robbers. He called a new Council at Chalcedon to sort out the mess.
The problem was that Jesus appeared to have two substances, two mutually exclusive things: both God and human. But the situation was even more complicated than that, because God, who was indivisible, seemed to have different parts: God the Father, and God the Son (Jesus). (There was also God the Holy Spirit – but that’s a whole other can of worms.)
To solve this problem the church made a distinction between two different meanings of the word substance. They borrowed the distinction from Aristotle between primary substance, and secondary substance. Compare these two sentences:
This substance is wax.
This is a waxy substance.
In the first sentence, the word substance refers to a particular instance, an individual thing, that specific object. Aristotle called this primary substance. In the second sentence, the word substance refers to the type or kind of thing it is, or the form that it has. Aristotle called this secondary substance.
A thing can only have one primary substance: one individual thing cannot be two individual things. But there is nothing to say it can’t have more secondary substances. Imagine I buy a very fancy and beautiful plate. It is so fancy, that it isn’t really designed to be eaten off. Instead, I put it on my wall as an ornament. This object has two secondary substances: it is a plate, and an ornament.
The early church applied this distinction to Jesus and God:
The primary substance of Jesus is both human and divine
Jesus is of divine secondary substance (the same substance as God), and human secondary substance.
Eventually, people began using Nestorius’ concept of prosopon to explain the relationship. In Latin, prosopon translates as persona– which eventually became our modern concept of person. So, now we have:
The person of Jesus is both human and divine
Jesus is of divine substance (the same substance as God), and human substance.
Look at this photograph of a baby. Can the baby see a rattle? Explain your answer.
–well the baby’s eyes work, so yes the baby can see the rattle.
–but does it see a rattle?
–well it doesn’t know what a rattle is, so it doesn’t know that it is a rattle, perhaps it just sees a shape.
–But the baby doesn’t know what a shape is either, or a colour, or a texture. So it can’t know that it sees those things either!
The baby can see the rattle in the sense that it’s eyes function, but it can’t see a rattle insofar as it cannot understand or comprehend the object as a rattle.
The word ‘rattle’ can refer to this particular rattle (Primary Substance), or it can refer to a type or category of thing (Secondary substance. The baby can see the particular thing, but it doesn’t understand what kind of thing it is.
This is the name for…
The individual, independent, unique thing.
The prosopon (mask), the person.
It is an answer to the question what are you? (Rather than what are you?)
You are your personality, your abilities, your dispositions etc. These things do not have a location, though they do have a vehicle - i.e. your body. You are not your just your body
This is the kind of thing that you are, the groups to which you belong.
It is an answer to the question what are you?
Whilst the Nestorian Controversy may feel very far removed from life today, the concept of Secondary Substance goes right to the heart of the concept of identity, that is the foundation of many of our controversial issues today. Can Jesus be both human and divine? Can someone be both a British person but also a European? Can someone be Muslim and Indian, Protestant and Irish, even male and female?
If we confuse Primary with Secondary substances, then we are in danger of believing that we can only be one or the other - that the two groups are mutually exclusive, that there is a dichotomy – when perhaps that’s not true. As Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie said in her Ted Talk, The Danger of a Single Story.
‘The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they aren't true, but they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story.’
Explain Nestorius’ argument and Cyril’s response in your own words.
Explain how the distinction between primary and secondary substance solves the problem.
Describe two of your different secondary substances.
What do you think of the Council of Chalcedon’s definition of a person?